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INTRODUCTION 
For better or worse, it is now widely accepted that we live in an 
“information age,” enabled by powerful technologies that collect, store, 
and analyze personal data.1 Businesses track purchases and Internet 
activity for commercial purposes,2 law enforcement agencies maintain 
expansive criminal record and biometric information databases,3 and the 
federal government makes regular use of “terrorist watch” and “no fly” 
lists.4 The databases, which have prompted a fruitful ongoing national 
discussion on the parameters of informational privacy, share a common 
feature: they usually are not shared with the public. This Article 
∗ Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of 
Law. Thanks to the Wisconsin Law Review for hosting the wonderful event and to Sade 
Oyinloye, AnnaLaura Rehwinkel, and Keith Savino for their excellent research 
assistance.  
1. See generally FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997);
SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2000); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 7–8 (2000).  
2. See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the
Indefinite Detention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 437–39 (2014). 
3. See Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561 passim
(2012).  
4. See Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted,
Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 336–45 (2014).  
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considers another kind of database, one that is decidedly more public in 
nature: sex offender registries. 
Today, as a result of laws in effect nationwide, identifying 
information on almost eight hundred thousand convicted sex offenders is 
collected and posted on government-operated Internet websites.5 
Colloquially known as Megan’s Laws—named after a seven-year-old 
girl in New Jersey who in 1994 was sexually assaulted and murdered by 
a recidivist sex offender who lived nearby6—the laws require that 
targeted individuals provide an array of data to law enforcement, 
including photos; home, school, and work addresses; vehicle 
identification information; e-mail or Internet identifiers; and descriptions 
of identifying body marks, such as scars and tattoos.7 Targeted 
individuals must thereafter verify the accuracy of information, on at least 
an annual basis (for some, every 90 days), and update it in the event of 
any changes (e.g., changes in residence or workplace or the growth of a 
beard),8 facing possible felony prosecution if they fail to do so.9  
The laws, which originated during the nation’s sharp swing toward 
harsh penal policies in the 1990s,10 have been largely immune to 
constitutional attack11 and have significantly expanded their reach over 
time.12 While other manifestations of penal harshness have experienced a 
5. See NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, MAP OF REGISTERED
SEX OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES, available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/
documents/Sex_Offenders_Map.pdf (2014); Number of Registrants Reported by 
State/Territory, PARENTS FOR MEGAN’S L. & CRIME VICTIMS CENTER, http://www.
parentsformeganslaw.org/public/meganReportCard.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2014). For 
examples of state website registries, see Sex Offender Search Options, ALA. L.
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, http://app.alea.gov/Community/wfSexOffenderSearch.aspx#1 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2015); Sex Offender Information, ARIZ. DEPARTMENT PUB. SAFETY, 
http://www.azdps.gov/Services/Sex_Offender/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015); Florida Sexual 
Offenders and Predators, FLA. DEPARTMENT L. ENFORCEMENT, https://offender.fdle.
state.fl.us/offender/homepage.do;jsessionid=KFkcFRfQ6kHxj3Faw49RdV2m- (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2015); NEB. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY, https://sor.nebraska.gov/ (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2015); WI Sex Offender Registry, WIS. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://
doc.wi.gov/community-resources/wi-sex-offender-registry (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).  
6. WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 54–55, 60 (2009).  
7. See, e.g., Megan’s Law, ST. N.J. DEPARTMENT L. & PUB. SAFETY, http://
www.state.nj.us/njsp/info/reg_sexoffend.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015); Megan’s Law 
Website, PA. ST. POLICE, http://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us/FAQ.aspx (last visited Jan. 
23, 2015). 
8. LOGAN, supra note 6, at 70, 80.
9. Id. at 70.
10. Id. at 90.
11. Id. at 136–47.
12. Since 1994, the federal government has played an integral role in this
growth by threatening to withhold funds from states that do not enact federally 
prescribed, more extensive and onerous registration and community notification laws. See 
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wind down of late—such as “three strikes” laws,13 mandatory minimum 
sentences,14 and other collateral consequences of conviction (e.g., loss of 
the right to vote)15—Megan’s Laws not only endure, they flourish.16 
This Article examines a particular outgrowth of this survival story, 
one directly affecting both the number of individuals on registries and 
their onerous quality: the extent to which registrants are provided an 
opportunity to exit registries. As will be discussed, individuals very often 
face a lifetime of registration requirements and community 
notification—a perpetual “rogues’ gallery.”17 If not, in the absence of 
their conviction being reversed or a gubernatorial pardon being granted 
(today a rare occurrence)18—and sometimes not even then19—individuals 
typically remain on registries for a minimum of 10 and up to 40 years.20 
This is so regardless of whether or not they have been convicted of 
another crime (sexual or otherwise) and their future likelihood of 
recidivism. 
During this time, individuals who are “off-paper” (i.e., they have 
served their time in prison or jail and/or community supervision) are 
subject to an array of distinct burdens and adverse consequences, in 
effect being legally forced to be complicit in their own monitoring.21 The 
Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative 
Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993, 997–99, 1007–08 (2010); Wayne A. Logan, 
Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51 
passim (2008).  
13. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, California Voters Seem Ready to End the State’s
‘Tough on Crime’ Era, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/10/31/california-voters-seem-ready-to-end-the-states-tough-on-
crime-era/.  
14. See, e.g., Peniel E. Joseph, Eric Holder’s War on the War on Drugs, ROOT,
Aug. 13, 2013, http://www.theroot.com/articles/politics/2013/08/attorney_general_eric_
holder_seeks_to_curtail_stiff_drug_sentences.html. 
15. See Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV.
1103 (2013). 
16. For more on the social and political forces behind this staying power, see
Wayne A. Logan, Megan’s Laws: A Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV.
371, 399–410 (2011).  
17. See infra Part I.A.1. For a discussion of rogues’ galleries—public displays
of convicted offenders’ mugshots—gaining popularity in mid-nineteenth century urban 
police departments, see Logan, supra note 3, at 1567–68. 
18. Margaret C. Love, When the Punishment Doesn’t Fit the Crime:
Reinventing Forgiveness in Unforgiving Times, 38 HUM. RTS., Summer 2011, at 2, 5. 
19. See infra notes197–98 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 43–83 and accompanying text.
21. See Heath v. State, 983 A.2d 77, 81 (Del. 2009) (“The Registry requirement
affects individual liberty more profoundly than simply serving as a recording mechanism 
for determining prior offenders.”); State v. Guidry, 96 P.3d 242, 249 (Haw. 2004) (“[T]he 
registration requirement imposes unending governmental regulation of basic life 
activities despite the completion of, and following any criminal sentence.”); Doe v. Att’y 
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very status of being a registrant, moreover, has consequences of its own: 
registrants often cannot change their names22 and face limits on where 
they can live.23 Registrant status can also result in satellite-based 
monitoring,24 being forced to carry an identification card,25 and having to 
pay an annual fee, which can be as much as $100.26 
The effects of registration, however, do not stand alone; rather, they 
combine with the even more significant effects of community 
notification. With community notification, information provided by 
registrants is displayed on specially created government-run websites and 
at times disseminated by more affirmative means such as by leaflets 
(often distributed by registrants themselves at their own expense).27 
Despite common government assertions that registry information is being 
made available merely as a public safety service, the context is anything 
but neutral.28 As the Arizona Court of Appeals recently noted, registrants 
“are not only forced to display a scarlet letter to the world, but state 
authorities are required to shine a spotlight on that letter.”29 The 
spotlighting has major adverse personal consequences for registrants, 
Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J., concurring) (stating that 
registration represents “a continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person 
himself”).  
22. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-292.6 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 817
(2010); WIS. STAT. § 301.47(2)(a) (2013–14). 
23. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence
Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2006). 
24. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40(a)(2)(ii).
25. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(J) (2010); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 11-8-8-15 (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp. 2014).
26. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 301.45(10); see also, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:542(D) (2012 & Supp. 2015) ($60 annual fee).
27. ALA. CODE § 15-20A-21(b) (LexisNexis 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4121(i) (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1(A)(3); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9799.27 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. § 301.46(5); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-303(c)(ii)
(2013).  
28. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1001 (Alaska 2008) (“A photograph
of each registrant appears on a webpage under the caption ‘Registered Sex 
Offender/Child Kidnapper.’ Each registrant’s page also displays the registrant’s physical 
description, home address, employer, work address, and conviction information.”).  
29. State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 900, 908 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also People v. Zaidi, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566, 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(terming registration and notification “an obligation communicating public disgrace for a 
lifetime”). Cf. Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between 
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (“No one 
doubts that Hester Prynne’s scarlet letter provided more than neutral information, or that 
the effort of Senator Joseph McCarthy to ‘expose’ the background of his political 
opponents was not simply public education.”). 
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including social ostracism, lost job and housing opportunities, and even 
harassment and vigilantism.30 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the limited 
opportunities for exit now afforded by state laws. Part II considers 
whether the lack of exit opportunity creates constitutional concern. 
Surprisingly, despite the expansive body of caselaw on registration and 
community notification more generally, the issue has been the subject of 
only limited attention, with courts thus far typically denying relief. With 
constitutional litigation holding little realistic promise for change, Part III 
considers how law reform advocates might persuade legislatures to 
expand opportunities for exit.  
I. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXIT 
Statutory law in every state today contains an expansive list of 
enumerated crimes that trigger registration,31 ranging from the very 
serious (e.g., forcible sexual assault and child molestation) to the less 
serious (e.g., peeping, indecent exposure, and bestiality).32 Possession of 
child pornography33 and child kidnapping by someone other than a 
parent or guardian34 are also common bases for registration. In addition 
to enumerated offenses, many jurisdictions also allow courts to require 
registration if a crime of conviction was “sexually motivated.”35 Eligible 
convictions date back many years, at a minimum encompassing those 
30. LOGAN, supra note 6, at 125–29; see also Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety &
Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123, 141–43 (Md. 2013) (surveying array of adverse effects).  
31. The list of predicate offenses has grown significantly over time, only on
rare occasion contracting. An example of contraction is found in the California 
Legislature’s decision in 2007 to rescind the registration requirement for adults 
previously convicted of now legal consensual sexual behavior. See CAL. PENAL CODE  
§ 290.019 (West 2014).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(C)(11), (12) (Supp. 2014) (buggery and
peeping); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-1(14) (2006 & Supp. 2014) (bestiality); see 
also, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2013) (adultery if one of the 
parties involved is less than 18 years of age).  
33. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-4.5(a)(13) (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp.
2014).  
34. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 301.45(1d)(b) (2013–14). Kidnapping is included
based on the rationale that it can be “a precursor” to a sexual offense. People v. Johnson, 
870 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. 2007). 
35. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 4026/10(c)(20) (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-12-2(c) (LexisNexis 2014); WIS. STAT. § 973.048(1m)(a) (2013–14). For examples
of jurisdictions using similar eligibility language see, for example, ALA. CODE 
§ 15-20A-5(39) (LexisNexis 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(C) (2010); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290.006. 
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occurring after the enactment of the registration and community 
notification laws (in the early- to mid-1990s) but often decades before.36 
In most states, all registrants are subject to community 
notification,37 with government websites only occasionally explicitly 
stating that registrants have not been evaluated for risk of reoffense.38 In 
a few states, such as Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New 
York, notification is limited: only information on those registrants 
determined to pose medium or high risk (based on the nature of the 
offense and/or clinical assessment) is made publicly available.39 States 
also at times designate registrants with particular labels; Florida, for 
instance, designates registrants as “sexual predators”40 or “sexual 
36. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(A) (dating back to 1978); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290(c) (dating back to 1944); MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400.1(1) (West 2011 
& Supp. 2014) (dating back to 1979); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.002(a) (West 
2006) (dating back to 1970).  
37. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 74–75.
38. See, e.g., Connecticut Sex Offender Registry, ST. CONN., http://www.
communitynotification.com/cap_office_disclaimer.php?office=54567 (last visited Feb. 6, 
2015); SONAR (Sex and Kidnap Offender Notification and Registration), UTAH 
DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://www.communitynotification.com/cap_office_
disclaimer.php?office=54438 (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).  
39. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178K(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2014);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052(subd. 4)(b)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:7-8(c) (West 2005); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-n(3) (McKinney 2014); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.550(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2015). A handful of other states also 
factor in risk to some extent. Texas and Vermont, for instance, post information on all 
registrants but indicate high or low risk. See Public Sex Offender Name Search, TEX.
DEPARTMENT PUB. SAFETY, https://records.txdps.state.tx.us/SexOffender/PublicSite/
Application/Search/Caveats.aspx?SearchType=Name (last visited Feb. 6, 2015); Sex 
Offender Registry, ST. VT. DEPARTMENT PUB. SAFETY, http://sheriffalerts.com/cap_main.
php?office=55275 (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). North Dakota also lists all registrants but 
indicates low, medium, or high risk (only high-risk and lifetime registrants have a photo 
displayed). See Sex Offender Web Site, ST. N.D. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.
sexoffender.nd.gov/OffenderWeb/search/publiclist (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). California 
ties eligibility for the public registry to offense type: home addresses are provided for 
registrants convicted of specified offenses whereas only a zip code is provided for others, 
and information regarding registrants not falling in the foregoing categories is viewable 
only by law enforcement. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.46. Based on information 
provided by the California Department of Justice, as of February 6, 2015, information on 
roughly 110,000 registrants was subject to public disclosure, while information on about 
30,000 registrants was not disclosed. See California Sex Registrant Statistics, ST. CAL.
DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/statistics.aspx?lang=ENGLISH (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2015). As of 2013, California posts risk assessment scores for specified 
registrants. See Megan’s Law Home, ST. CAL. DEPARTMENT JUST., OFF. ATT’Y GEN.,
http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/index.aspx?lang=ENGLISH (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).  
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(4) (West 2010 & Supp. 2015).
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offenders.”41 In most states, youthful offenders, adjudicated delinquent in 
juvenile court, are subject to community notification.42 
As discussed next, if states have been generous with respect to the 
reach of registration and community notification laws, they have been 
decidedly ungenerous in extending registrants opportunities to get off 
registries. 
A. Registrants Eligible for Exit 
1. NO OR EXTREMELY LIMITED OPPORTUNITY
South Carolina takes the most extreme position: no registrant is 
provided the possibility of exit; all (including juveniles) face lifetime 
registration and community notification.43 Only in the event a 
registerable conviction is reversed or a pardon is conferred will removal 
and even then only if the pardon “is based on a finding of not guilty 
specifically stated.”44 
A cluster of other states provide somewhat greater but still very 
limited opportunity for relief. Alabama specifies that only some juveniles 
can petition for exit from the state’s lifetime registration requirement.45 
South Dakota46 does as well but also extends the possibility of relief to 
those convicted of incest or bestiality (after 25 years on the registry).47 
The only exceptions to Arizona’s lifetime48 registration requirement 
involve certain juvenile registrants49 and individuals convicted of 
non-parental kidnapping or unlawful imprisonment of a minor (who can 
seek relief after 10 years).50 Nebraska allows relief only to those 
convicted of misdemeanors, who must register for 15 years yet can 
petition for relief after 10 years on the registry; all other registrants must 
remain on the registry for 25 years or life.51 
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2015).
42. Catherine L. Carpenter, Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, 82 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 747 (2014). 
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-460(A) (Supp. 2014).
44. Id. § 23-3-430(F).
45. ALA. CODE § 15-20A-24 (LexisNexis 2011).
46. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-19 (Supp. 2014).
47. Id. § 22-24B-19.1.
48. Alone among jurisdictions, Arizona statutory law does not specify the
duration of registration; the state’s courts have concluded that the “default” registration 
period is lifetime. Fisher v. Kaufman, 38 P.3d 38, ¶ 11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).  
49. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(D), (G), (H) (2010 & Supp. 2014).
50. Id. § 13-3821(M).
51. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4005(1)(b)(i), (2) (LexisNexis 2009).
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2. SOMEWHAT BROADER, PER COMPLETION OF TERM
Next on the continuum are the jurisdictions that allow possible relief 
to a larger yet still select group of registrants who, if not required to 
register for their lifetimes, can petition for relief only after fulfilling their 
minimum registration period, ranging from 10 to 25 years.52 In some 
jurisdictions removal appears to be automatic upon petition after passage 
of the minimum term.53 In other instances, courts have discretion to bar 
relief to a petitioner.54 Kansas, which requires registration for 15 years, 
25 years, or life terms,55 expressly states that no right to petition for early 
exit exists.56 
52. ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.020(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (if not lifetime, petition after
15 years); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(D); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-919(a)–(b) 
(2009 & Supp. 2013) (if not lifetime, petition after 15 years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 54-251(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014) (if not lifetime, petition after 10 years); D.C. 
CODE § 22-4002(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2001) (same); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/7 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-19(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2014 
& Supp. 2014) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.520(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (if not 
lifetime, petition after 20 years); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34-A 
§ 11225-A(1)–(3) (2010) (if not lifetime, petition after 10 years); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
6, § 178G (LexisNexis 2011) (if not lifetime, petition after 20 years); MINN. STAT. ANN.  
§ 243.166(subd. 6)(a), (d) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-11A-4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (if not lifetime, petition after 10 years); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9799.15 (West 2014 & Supp. 2014) (if not lifetime, petition after 15 
years if tier I offender or 25 years if tier II offender); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-4(a)–(b) 
(2002 & Supp. 2013) (if not lifetime, petition after 10 years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 5407(e)–(f) (2009) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-910 (2012) (if not lifetime, petition
after 15 or 25 years); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.140(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2015) (if 
not lifetime, petition after 10 or 15 years); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-4 (LexisNexis 
2014) (if not lifetime, petition after 10 years); WIS. STAT. § 301.45(5) (2013–14) (if not 
lifetime, petition after 15 years).  
53. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.020(a)(2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3821(D); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-251(a); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/7;
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-19 ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(a), (b) (Supp. 2013); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 17.529; VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-910; VT. STAT. ANN. § tit. 13, § 5407(e)–(f); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.140(1)–(3); WIS. STAT. § 301.45(5).  
54. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4002; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-10(f)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-47(2)–(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 
2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-4; VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-910(A); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15-12-4(a).
55. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906.
56. Id. § 22-4908. The only exception being that those under age 14 at the time
of their registerable offense can be relieved of registration at age 18 or five years from the 
date of adjudication or release from confinement, whichever is later. Id. § 22-4906(f)–(h).  
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3. POSSIBILITY OF EARLY EXIT
Finally, in a majority of jurisdictions, opportunity exists for preterm 
exit, but the opportunity is usually quite limited.57 Adjudicated juveniles 
are the most common subclass of registrants provided a right to petition. 
In Pennsylvania, for instance, only adjudicated juvenile lifetime 
registrants can petition for early relief, after 25 years.58 When legislatures 
expand the scope of those eligible for relief they do so with respect to 
registrants convicted of less serious offenses, yet require extended wait 
periods. In Wyoming, where lifetime registration is the norm, 
adjudicated juveniles can petition after 10 years and individuals 
convicted of specified less serious offenses after 25 years.59 In Florida, 
also a lifetime registration jurisdiction, “Romeo and Juliet” offenders can 
seek relief at any time,60 and a handful of other less serious offender 
subgroups can do so after 25 years.61 In Missouri, registration is lifetime, 
but Romeo and Juliet registrants can petition after two years.62 The only 
other Missouri registrants eligible to petition for early relief (at 10 years) 
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.5 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-22-113 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121(d)(6) (Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 943.04354 (West Supp. 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19 (2014); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 846E-10(a), (e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1) 
(Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:544(E) (Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 11-707(4)(iv) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178G; MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.728(9) (West 2012 & Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT.  
§ 589.400.7–8 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506(3)(b) (2013);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4005(2) (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 179D.490(3) (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:6(III)(a)(2)(3)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(f) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014); N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW § 168-h(2) (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.12A (2013); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(16) (2012 & Supp. 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2950.15 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 583(E) (West Supp. 2015); OR.
REV. STAT. § 181.820 (2013); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9799.17(a)(1) (West 2014); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207 (2014); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.404–.405 
(West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-41-112 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.44.142; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-304 (2013). 
58. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9799.17(a)(1). Adults must register for their full
term: 15 years, 25 years, or their lifetime. Id. § 9799.15(a). 
59. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-304.
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354. The “Romeo and Juliet” subclass refers to
those adjudicated or convicted of consensual sexual activity when four years older or less 
than the victim, who was between the ages of 13 and 18. Matos v. State, 111 So. 3d 694, 
965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(11).
62. MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400.8.
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are those convicted of specified less serious offenses63 and parents or 
guardians convicted of kidnapping or nonsexual abuse of their children.64 
In Hawaii, only lifetime registrants have a right to petition for early 
termination, after 40 years on the registry.65 In North Dakota, the 
registration period is 15 years, 25 years, or lifetime, and the only 
registrants eligible to seek early release are those convicted before 1999 
of an offense for which registration is no longer required.66 New York, 
with perhaps the nation’s most due process-based system of classifying 
registrants,67 is notably restrictive when it comes to exit: level I 
registrants must remain on the registry for their full 20 years, without 
right to relief; level II or level III registrants are lifetime registrants and 
cannot petition for relief; and only a select subgroup of less serious level 
II registrants can seek relief after 30 years.68 Other examples of early 
termination include the following: 
• In Idaho, all registrants are lifetime, but select registrants
can petition after 10 years.69
• In Oregon, all registrants are lifetime, but specified
registrants, convicted of a class C felony or certain
misdemeanor offenses, can seek relief after 10 years.70
• In Nebraska, lifetime and 25-year registrants are not eligible
for early release; only the 15-year category can petition for
relief after 10 years.71
• In North Carolina, registration is for 30 years or lifetime,
with only the 30-year group eligible to petition for relief
after 10 years.72
• In Wyoming, the registration period is lifetime, but certain
registrants can petition for removal after 1073 or 25 years.74 
63. Id. § 589.400.7.
64. Id. § 589.400.6.
65. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-10(a), (e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
Ten- and 25-year registrants can petition for relief after 10 and 25 years. Id. 
§ 846E-10(b)–(c).
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(8), (16) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
67. See Wayne A. Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender
Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2000). 
68. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168-h(1), (2), -o(1) (McKinney 2014).
69. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1) (Supp. 2014).
70. OR. REV. STAT. § 181.820(1)(a) (2013).
71. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4005(1) to (2) (LexisNexis 2009).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.12A(a), -208.23 (2013).
73. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-304(a)(i) (2013).
74. Id. § 7-19-304(a)(ii). For other examples, see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.
§ 11-707 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (with the exception of some adjudicated juveniles who
must register for five years, registration period is 15 years, 25 years, or life; juveniles can 
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California, which mandates lifetime registration and has the greatest 
number of registrants of any state, takes a different approach. A select 
subset of registrants, not falling within an expansive list of excluded 
categories,75 can after 10 years on the registry petition for relief on the 
basis of a “certificate of rehabilitation.”76  
A handful of other states have seen fit to allow petitions at 
significantly shorter durations of time. Iowa has the nation’s most 
generous relief provision: registration is for 10 years or lifetime, but 
registrants convicted of less serious crimes can petition after two years, 
and those convicted of more serious crimes can petition after five years.77 
Less generous but still notable compared to other jurisdictions is 
Tennessee: lifetime registration is required,78 but all but the most serious 
offenders79 can seek removal after 10 years.80 Three other states make 
petition available for at least some registrants after five years: 
• Utah bars relief for lifetime registrants but allows possible
relief for a subset of its other category, 10-year registrants,
who can petition after five years.81
• New Hampshire tier III lifetime registrants lack a right to
petition, but tier II and lifetime registrants can petition after
15 years, while tier I registrants, subject to a 10-year term,
can petition after five years.82
• In Colorado, lifetime registration is required for all
registrants, but certain registrants can petition for removal
seek early relief, as can the 15-year subgroup (after 10 years)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 28.728c (West 2012) (tier I (15-year) registrants can petition after 10 years, tier III
(lifetime) can petition at the 25-year mark, and tier II (25-year) registrants are ineligible 
for early relief). 
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.01(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015).
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.5 (West 2014). The certificate, if issued, is then
forwarded to the governor for consideration as the basis for a possible pardon. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 4852.13. California law also allows relief for individuals convicted before 
1976 of sexual acts between consenting adults that were later decriminalized. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290.19. Under California law, moreover, some registrants can apply for 
exclusion from the website but if successful must still continue to comply with the 
lifetime registration requirement. Id. § 290.46.  
77. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.128(2)(a), (6) (West Supp. 2014); State v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d 76, 85 (Iowa 2014). In Iowa, tier designations (I-III), based on 
offense seriousness, determine the frequency of registration verification, not duration of 
registration. § 692A.108.  
78. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-202, -207 (2014).
79. Id. § 40-39-207(g), (j).
80. Id. § 40-39-207(a).
81. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-41-105, -112(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014).
82. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:6(III)(a)(2)–(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014).
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after 10 or 20 years (five years for certain 
misdemeanants).83 
B. Criteria and Procedures 
Jurisdictions often do not provide much in the way of detail when it 
comes to petition criteria and procedures. While laws usually require that 
a petitioner not be convicted or adjudicated of another registerable 
offense84 or a felony,85 a petitioner can be disqualified because of a mere 
arrest for another registerable offense86 or a felony or misdemeanor (even 
if nonsexual).87 It is also common to require that a petitioner successfully 
complete any court-ordered treatment program.88 In California, which as 
noted permits relief based on a “certificate of rehabilitation,” the 
standard is that a registrant “shall live an honest and upright life, shall 
conduct himself or herself with sobriety and industry, shall exhibit a 
good moral character, and shall conform to and obey the laws of the 
land.”89 
Not surprisingly, risk of recidivism figures prominently in most 
laws,90 but some important variation is seen in two areas. The first 
concerns how risk is conceived. In most states, the court is asked to 
consider the risk posed by the petitioner but the quantum of tolerable risk 
varies. In Idaho, for instance, the relief “mechanism is strict and presents 
a very high hurdle for offenders”91: registrants must show that it is 
“highly probable” or “reasonably certain” that they will not commit 
another registerable offense.92 In Hawaii, the court can grant relief only if 
satisfied that the petitioner is (1) “very unlikely to commit a 
[registerable] offense ever again” and (2) continued registration “will not 
assist in protecting the safety of the public or any member thereof.”93 In 
other states, such as Arkansas, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, the 
question is whether the petitioner “is not likely to pose a danger to the 
83. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-22-113 (West 2006).
84. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(c).
85. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.128(3) (West 2009).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.12A(a1) (2013).
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(11)(a)1 (West Supp. 2015).
88. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.128(2)(b) (West Supp. 2014).
89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.05 (West 2014).
90. Nebraska and Wyoming omit any express mention of recidivism risk. NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4005(2) (LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-304(d) 
(2013). 
91. State v. Kimball, 181 P.3d 468, 472 (Idaho 2008).
92. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(4) (Supp. 2014).
93. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-10(f)(3)–(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
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safety of others.”94 In Virginia, a court shall grant a petition if the 
petitioner “no longer poses a risk to public safety.”95 In Missouri, the 
registrant must not be “a current or potential threat to public safety.”96 In 
Georgia, the court must find that the registrant “does not pose a 
substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual offense.”97 
At times, however, risk is cast in broad public safety terms. 
Montana law provides that a court can grant relief if “continued 
registration is not necessary for public protection and . . . relief from 
registration is in the best interests of society.”98 In Utah, the court may 
grant a petition if it determines that “it is not contrary to the interests of 
the public to do so.”99 
Some states take a hybrid approach. In Mississippi, the petitioner 
must show that “future registration . . . will not serve the purposes of [the 
law] and the court is otherwise satisfied that the petitioner is not a current 
or potential threat to public safety.”100 In New York, a registrant must 
show that his “risk of repeat offense and threat to public safety is such 
that registration or verification is no longer necessary.”101 
The second area in which states differ is the burden of proof that a 
petitioner must satisfy. In most jurisdictions, the standard is clear and 
convincing.102 In Hawaii, the standard is “substantial evidence and more 
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”103 In at least two states 
(Arkansas and Georgia), the standard is preponderance of the 
evidence,104 while in others the petition provision fails to specify a 
burden of proof.105 
94. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178G (LexisNexis 2011); see also ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 12-12-919(b)(2)(B) (2009 & Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:7-2(f) (West 2005 
& Supp. 2014). 
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-910(A) (2012).
96. MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400.9(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015).
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-19(g) (2014).
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506(3)(b)(ii) (2013).
99. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-41-112(4)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014).
 100. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-47(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2014). 
 101. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-o(1) (McKinney 2014). 
 102. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-24(b) (LexisNexis 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 18-8310(4) (Supp. 2014); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178G (LexisNexis 2011); MISS 
CODE ANN. § 45-33-47(3); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-o(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.820 
(2013). The standard, according to the Oregon Court of Appeals, “requires evidence of 
extraordinary persuasiveness—that is, evidence establishing that the truth of the facts in 
issue is highly probable.” Patterson v. Foote, 204 P.3d 97, 101 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).  
 103. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-10(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-919(b)(2) (2009 & Supp. 2013); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 42-1-19(f) (2014).
 105. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.400 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-41-112(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-910(A) 
(2012). 
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C. Summary 
As the foregoing highlights, jurisdictions vary considerably with 
respect to exit. On one extreme are jurisdictions that preclude or severely 
circumscribe the possibility; in others, more opportunity for relief is 
available, but it is extended to an only somewhat larger pool of 
registrants who have been on the registry for anywhere from 10 to 40 
years.106 In a handful of jurisdictions, some registrants, typically 
juveniles or adults convicted of less serious offenses, can petition for 
relief after shorter periods, with Iowa and Tennessee standing out as 
being especially generous.107 
Variability is also seen in petition criteria and procedures. It is not 
unusual, for instance, for laws to omit specification of the standard of 
proof a petitioner must satisfy.108 At least as problematic, recidivism risk 
thresholds can be unrealistically demanding.109 While recidivism risk 
understandably plays a lynchpin role in relief decisions, risk assessment 
presents unique challenges in this context. Decision makers have a 
natural aversion for Type II errors (wrongly certifying a petitioner as 
unlikely to recidivate),110 and logic and experience support that risk of 
reoffense can never be predicted as nonexistent.111 Indeed, professional 
norms prohibit psychosexual evaluators from making “statements 
asserting that a [subject] is no longer at any risk to reoffend.”112 
Nevertheless, state laws can require that courts assess whether a 
registrant poses any threat to public safety113 or prescribe an 
 106. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 107. See supra notes 77−83 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.  
 109. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.  
110. Such reluctance is in abundant evidence in the related context of release 
decisions from involuntary civil confinement for persons designated as a “sexually 
violent predator.” See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the 
Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 320–21 
(2003). Cf. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1380 (2009) (noting with respect to national security cases that courts are often “loath to 
question the judgment of executive officials when push comes to shove”).  
 111. See generally Ruth J. Tully et al., A Systematic Review on the Effectiveness 
of Sex Offender Risk Assessment Tools in Predicting Sexual Recidivism of Adult Male Sex 
Offenders, 33 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 287 (2013).  
 112. See ASS’N FOR TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, PRACTICE STANDARDS AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION, TREATMENT, AND MANAGEMENT OF ADULT MALE 
SEXUAL ABUSERS 22 (2005), available at http://www.atsa.com/ATSAmemberDocs/
2004RevisedStandards.pdf.  
 113. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. To date, only rarely have 
courts seen fit to temper this absolutism. See In re Harold W., No. 2-12-1235, 2014 WL 
1572518, at *6–7 (Ill. App. Ct. April 18, 2014) (upholding denial of a petition for a 
low-risk registrant while stating that requiring proof of the “complete absence of risk 
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unrealistically high quantum of evaluated risk, such as in Idaho (“highly 
probable” to not reoffend)114 or Hawaii (“very unlikely” to reoffend).115 
No less problematic are laws predicating relief on a generalized 
sense that requiring continued registration of an individual comports with 
broad public safety goals. In Montana, for instance, where relief can be 
obtained only if “continued registration is not necessary for public 
protection and . . . relief from registration is in the best interests of 
society,”116 the state supreme court recently upheld a petition denial 
despite a finding that the petitioner posed a low risk of reoffense.117 After 
noting that “protection from recidivism by sexual offenders is the 
primary purpose of the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act,” the 
court concluded that “evidence that there is some risk of reoffending is a 
sufficient basis to deny relief from the duty to register.”118 
The upshot is that for many thousands of registrants, absent reversal 
of a conviction or a pardon (and perhaps not even then),119 very little or 
no realistic prospect of exit exists. And even for the fortunate few who 
enjoy a right to petition, practical impediments can stand in the way: they 
must pay for filing fees,120 risk assessments,121 and a lawyer.122 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
To date, lack of opportunity for exit has not often figured in 
constitutional litigation. Most commonly, lack of exit has arisen in 
claims challenging the retroactive application of laws, based on state or 
federal ex post facto clauses, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith 
would mean that no one would ever be able to satisfy the statute beyond any 
doubt . . . because it is virtually impossible to eliminate all risk of reoffending” and  
“[t]here is always a possibility that sex offenders will reoffend”); Patterson v. Foote, 204 
P.3d 97, 102 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting government argument that a petitioner must 
prove an absolute absence of any possibility of recidivism).  
 114. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(4) (Supp. 2014).  
 115. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-10(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
 116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-506(3)(b)(ii) (2013). 
 117. Langford v. State, 2013 MT 265, ¶¶ 17–18, 309 P.3d 993.  
 118. Id. ¶ 16. 
 119. See infra notes 197–99 and accompanying text.  
 120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-24(m) (LexisNexis 2011) ($200 filing fee); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 21.135 (2013) ($252 filing fee); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78A-2-301(1)(b)(vi) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2014) ($125 filing fee).
 121. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-B:6(III)(a)(2)–(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2014); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.406 (West 2006). 
 122. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-17 (2006 & Supp. 2014) (“No 
person petitioning the court . . . for an order terminating the person’s obligation to 
register is entitled to court appointed counsel, experts, or publicly funded witnesses.”). In 
California, registrants are afforded the right to counsel when seeking a certificate of 
rehabilitation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.08 (West 2011). 
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v. Doe123 being the foremost instance. In response to the majority’s
conclusion that Alaska’s law was nonpunitive in its effect and was thus 
constitutional, Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) in dissent 
attached the “heaviest weight” in her analysis to the following fact:  
[T]he [law] makes no provision whatever for the possibility of 
rehabilitation: Offenders cannot shorten their registration or 
notification period, even on the clearest demonstration of 
rehabilitation or conclusive proof of physical incapacitation. 
However plain it may be that a former sex offender poses no 
threat of recidivism, he will remain subject to long-term 
monitoring and inescapable humiliation.124 
Applying their own ex post facto provisions, the supreme courts of 
Indiana,125 Maine,126 New Hampshire,127 and Oklahoma128 have echoed 
this view. 
State and lower federal courts, however, most often have rejected ex 
post facto claims, reasoning in line with the Smith majority that 
registration and community notification laws are regulatory and 
nonpunitive in nature, even when they retroactively extend registration 
periods and limit or bar opportunity for exit altogether.129 In some 
instances courts have rebuffed claims based on the rationale that the law 
123. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).  
 124. Id. at 117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).  
 125. Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 320 (Ind. 2013) (deeming law punitive 
because it applied without regard for degree to which “a prior offender has been 
rehabilitated and does not present a risk to the public”); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 
384 (Ind. 2009) (deeming it significant that law “provides no mechanism by which a 
registered sex offender can petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued 
registration and disclosure” and noting that “[o]ffenders cannot shorten their registration 
or notification period, even on the clearest proof of rehabilitation”). 
 126. State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 62, 985 A.2d 4 (retroactive application of 
lifetime registration requirement “without, at a minimum, affording those offenders any 
opportunity to ever be relieved of the duty as was permitted under [prior law] is 
punitive”). 
 127. Doe v. State, No. 2013–496, 2015 WL 575847, at *17 (N.H. Feb. 12, 2015) 
(attaching particular importance to state’s “lifetime-registration-without review 
provision”). 
 128. Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 OK 43, ¶¶ 72–73, 305 P.3d 1004 
(deeming punitive retroactive removal of mechanism for registrant “to petition for relief 
or discharge from the obligation of registration and the many contingent obligations 
resulting from . . . registration”). 
129. See Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of 
Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1121–22 
(2012).  
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challenged allowed some modest right to petition, with the possibility of 
exit essentially used as a buffer against constitutional redress.130 
Lack of opportunity for exit would appear well suited to serve as a 
basis to bring a procedural due process challenge. Although the Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed such a claim, it has come close. In the 
same term as Smith, the Supreme Court in Connecticut Department of 
Public Safety v. Doe131 (CDPS) held that procedural due process does not 
require that a risk assessment be conducted before an individual is 
subject to registration and community notification.132 The CDPS Court 
held that Connecticut’s conviction-based approach to registration and 
community notification was permissible because the state’s website 
registry stated that individuals were included solely because of their 
conviction, not the recidivism risk they might pose.133 Writing for the 
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that “even if respondent could 
prove that he is not likely to be currently dangerous, Connecticut has 
decided that the registry information on all sex offenders—currently 
dangerous or not—must be publicly disclosed. . . . [A]ny hearing on 
current dangerousness [would be] a bootless exercise.”134 The petitioners, 
in short, received all the procedural due process they were due when they 
were lawfully convicted of a registerable offense.135 
CDPS, while of critical importance, concerned government refusal 
to allow individuals to contest placement on a registry,136 not lack of 
access to relief postregistration. Surprisingly, to date the latter issue has 
seemingly been directly addressed on only three occasions, once in 
Tennessee and twice in West Virginia, and was rejected.137 
 130. See State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 900, 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); People v. 
Parilla, 109 A.D.3d 20, 25–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Kammerer v. State, 2014 WY 50, 
¶ 31, 322 P.3d 827.  
131. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).  
 132. Id. at 4. 
 133. Id. at 7. 
 134. Id. at 7–8.  
 135. See id. at 7 (stating that registration is based on “an offender’s conviction 
alone—a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded 
opportunity to contest”).  
136. For a rare instance of a court granting due process relief in a case 
challenging the retroactive application of registration without an opportunity to challenge 
a conclusive presumption of dangerousness as a result of a conviction, see Doe v. Sex 
Offender Registry Bd., 882 N.E.2d 298, 308–09 (Mass. 2008) (granting relief on state 
constitutional grounds).  
 137. In re Jimmy M.W., No. 13-0762, 2014 WL 24042298, at *1–3 (W. Va. May 
30, 2014).  
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In the Tennessee case, Doe v. State,138 the petitioner was convicted 
of aggravated sexual battery in 1983, was paroled from prison in 1987, 
and successfully completed parole in 1993.139 Fourteen years later, in 
2007, Tennessee amended its registration law (which took effect in 1995) 
to retroactively require registration of individuals convicted of sexual 
offenses before 1995.140 Petitioner registered as required and later 
challenged the circa 2007 law requiring his lifetime registration as a 
“violent sexual offender” without opportunity to petition for removal 
from the registry.141 In an unpublished decision, the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals summarily rejected petitioner’s state constitutional claim that 
the lack of exit opportunity violated procedural due process, relying upon 
CDPS, which involved a “similar challenge.”142  
In the first of the two West Virginia cases, Haislop v. Edgell,143 the 
Supreme Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court) undertook an only 
somewhat fuller examination of the question. The three petitioners, 
lifetime registrants, contended that their due process rights under the 
West Virginia Constitution were violated because they were placed on 
the public registry without individualized risk evaluation and state law 
lacked “any mechanism by which a registrant could demonstrate that he 
or she has been rehabilitated and is no longer dangerous to the public.”144 
The Haislop court rebuffed both challenges, citing CDPS and noting that 
the state’s law, like the Connecticut law upheld in CDPS, was “offense 
based” and did not turn on a finding of dangerousness.145  
 Despite its holding, the Haislop court took the opportunity to voice 
its concern over the lack of any possibility of exit based on demonstrated 
rehabilitation. Citing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Smith v. Doe, noted 
above,146 the court remarked: 
The courts of this state are often called upon to make custody 
decisions that could involve sex offenders, and quite probably 
have made some custodial determinations in favor of 
138. No. M2008–00807–COA–R3–CV, 2009 WL 637104 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 
10, 2009).  
 139. Id. at *1.  
 140. Id. at *1, 3.  
 141. Id. at *6.  
 142. Id. at *6–7.  
143. 593 S.E.2d 839 (W. Va. 2003).  
 144. Id. at 847.  
 145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that state law did 
provide a narrow subgroup—“sexually violent predators”—subject to the most onerous 
registration requirements, a postdesignation right to petition a court to have the label 
removed (as distinct from terminating registration altogether). Id. at 848 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 146. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  
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individuals who would be required to register . . . . It does seem 
logically incongruent that a court has the power to make a 
determination that a person convicted of a sexual offense has 
been rehabilitated to the extent he or she can have custody of a 
child, but such a person has no means by which to ask for an 
end to registration as a sex offender.147  
The court, however, was “still not convinced that the appellants in this 
case have demonstrated a violation of their procedural due process rights. 
While the Legislature has the power to amend the Act in a way that 
would give the appellants the opportunity to show they should not have 
to register for life, it has not yet made any such amendment.”148  
Over a decade later, with the legislature not having acted, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals addressed another procedural due process 
challenge to the lack of exit possibility. In In re Jimmy M.W.,149 the 
petitioner was placed on the West Virginia registry in 1998 as a result of 
pleading no contest to sexual abuse in the third degree—a 
misdemeanor—for touching the breast of a 15-year-old girl when he was 
an adult.150 Because the victim was a minor, the state required that the 
petitioner register for his lifetime.151 In 2012, after remaining compliant 
with registration requirements for 14 years and marrying the victim and 
raising children with her, petitioner’s effort to be removed from the 
registry was rebuffed by a state trial court.152  
The Supreme Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed 
on the basis of Haislop.153 In dissent, Chief Justice Davis, joined by 
Justice Ketchum, echoed the concern voiced in Haislop over the lack of 
any possibility of exit: 
The defendant is required to register as a sex offender for the 
rest of his life because he touched the breast of a girl he later 
married. In addition, our law provides that he can never be 
removed from the sex offender registry even if he is later 
rehabilitated. 
This makes no sense. Violent criminals serving long prison 
terms are eligible for parole if they rehabilitate while in prison. 
Drug addicts are sent to rehabilitation. 
 147. Haislop, 593 S.E.2d at 849.  
 148. Id. at 850. 
149. No. 13-0762, 2014 WL 2404298 (W. Va. May 30, 2014). 
 150. Id. at *1. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at *3.  
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This man received worse than a scarlet letter. He will be 
limited in obtaining employment and [his identifying 
information] will be published on the internet registry until he 
dies. The majority opines that the Sex Offender Registration 
Act is not punitive. It is worse than punitive if you have been 
rehabilitated and are required to tell your prospective 
employers that you are a sex offender.154 
Two other constitutional avenues possibly afford bases for relief. 
First, it could be argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal protection of the law is violated when the government provides an 
opportunity for exit to some but not other categories of registrants. 
Concurring in CDPS, Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) 
remarked that Connecticut’s law allowing courts discretion to exempt a 
few select subgroups of convicts from registration and community 
notification could raise equal protection concern.155  
The first basis to raise such a claim—that the varied treatment turns 
on a suspect (or quasi-suspect) classification or implicates a fundamental 
right—would likely be to no avail.156 As a consequence, a petitioner 
would need to persuade a reviewing court that the legislative decision to 
allow possible relief to some but not other registrants impermissibly 
treats similarly situated individuals differently without a rational basis in 
law.157 In California, courts of appeal on occasion have faulted the 
legislature for imposing limits on the ability of some registrants to exit 
based on a “certificate of rehabilitation.”158 In South Dakota, the state 
supreme court unanimously backed an equal protection challenge against 
the state’s decision to allow adult but not juvenile registrants to exit 
when they obtained a suspended imposition of sentence.159 Despite these 
successes, as with registration-related equal protection claims more 
 154. Id. (Ketchum, J., dissenting). 
 155. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2003) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 156. See, e.g., Butler v. Jones, 2013 OK 105, ¶ 12, 321 P.3d 161 (noting that 
“[s]ex offenders are not members of a suspect class nor is there a fundamental right at 
stake in this case”). 
 157. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Learning Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 158. See, e.g., People v. Schoop, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 210–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012); D.M. v. Dep’t of Justice, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 798, 807–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). But 
see People v. Adair, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting claim 
because petitioner was not similarly situated to other registrants provided earlier petition 
opportunity).  
 159. In re Z.B., 2008 SD 108, ¶ 4 n.1, ¶ 10, 757 N.W.2d 595. 
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generally,160 such claims would face a steep uphill battle, based on 
deference typically shown to legislatively drawn classifications.161 
Finally, a substantive due process claim could conceivably be 
available, based on a fleeting reference by Justice Souter in CDPS.162 But 
again a registrant would face considerable difficulty: he or she would 
need to establish that registration and notification jeopardize a 
fundamental right, which exit would restore.163 The last two decades of 
litigation, however, have made clear that courts do not look favorably 
upon the claim that a right to privacy or reputation serves as an 
actionable basis for challenge.164 A registrant would therefore need to 
convince a court that a legislature acted without a rational basis in 
denying opportunity for exit, a conclusion that courts typically are 
reluctant to reach.165 
In sum, for registrants lacking a legislative option for exit, 
constitutional litigation seemingly provides little chance of success. 
Among the possibilities discussed, procedural due process would appear 
to have the greatest potential. Despite the large shadow cast by CDPS,166 
a persuasive claim can be made that a finding of current dangerousness, 
postregistration, would not be in the Court’s words a “bootless 
exercise.”167 Even if a conviction is the sole basis to justify registration in 
the first instance, as in Connecticut and the majority of state registration 
schemes,168 the fact that for at least some registrants state law allows for 
 160. See, e.g., Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2014) (New York law); 
Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346–48 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida law); Johnson v. Dep’t 
of Justice, 341 P.3d 1075, 1077–78 (Cal. 2015); State v. Dickerson, 97 A.3d 15, 17 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2014); Doe I v. Williams, 61 A.3d 718, 736 (Me. 2013).  
161. Such was the outcome, for example, in the West Virginia case noted earlier 
in the text. See In re Jimmy M.W., No. 13-0762, 2014 WL 2404298, at *2 (W. Va. May 
30, 2014) (“Petitioner committed his crime against a minor. He fails to establish that he is 
similarly situated to sex offenders who do not commit acts against minors or who 
otherwise do not fall within [the subgroups warranting 10-year registration].”).  
 162. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 9 (2003) (Souter, J., 
concurring).  
163. Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 962 
n.35 (2002).
 164. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 141–47 (surveying case law). 
 165. See, e.g., Ex parte Chamberlain, 352 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) 
(rejecting substantive due process challenge because the Texas Legislature rationally 
concluded that “Texas’s citizens should continue to be protected from perpetrators of this 
type of sexual offense”).  
 166. See also, e.g., Clark v. O’Connell, No. 4:13–CV–0129–TUC–JAS(JR), 
2015 WL 736330, at *7 (D. Ariz. 2015) (relying on CDPS to reject challenge against 
state law that “imposes lifetime registration obligations on all offenders and offers no 
mechanism to seek relief”).  
 167. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 7–8.  
 168. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 75. 
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postregistration relief, based on rehabilitation in some shape or form,169 
suggests the legal materiality of a subsequent evaluation. Likewise, in 
jurisdictions where registrants are placed in tiers, affecting either or both 
registration requirements and the extent of community notification, 
postregistration evaluation would appear material. This is especially so in 
the handful of states where courts have held that due process requires 
that the initial tiering decision be based on individualized risk 
evaluations, such as New Jersey170 and Massachusetts.171 
A registrant, however, would still need to convince a court that 
registration and community notification implicate a constitutionally 
protectable liberty interest, the threshold requirement in any procedural 
due process challenge.172 The CDPS Court assumed without deciding 
that Connecticut’s law did so, based on what has come to be known as 
the “stigma plus” test,173 but concluded that an individualized risk 
assessment was not material under Connecticut’s law.174 Courts directly 
addressing the question in the context of conviction-based registration 
and community notification regimes, however, have usually refused to 
find a liberty interest.175  
III. SEX OFFENDER EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE WAY FORWARD
Given the limited prospects for a successful constitutional 
challenge, any expansion in opportunity for exit will need to come from 
the political branches, especially legislatures. For this to occur, however, 
law reformers will need to change the framing of sex offender 
registration and community notification policy. 
Since originating in the early- to mid-1990s, registration and 
notification laws have enjoyed broad public and political support, 
catalyzed in significant part by a politically potent mix of fear and 
disdain for sex offenders, epitomized by the trench-coated stranger who 
sexually molests children.176 Of late, law reform advocates have 
 169. See supra Part I.B.  
 170. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).  
 171. Doe v. Att’y Gen., 715 N.E.2d 37 (Mass. 1999). 
 172. See Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural 
Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1178–86 (1999). 
 173. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 6–7 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693 (1976)).  
 174. Id. at 4, 7. 
 175. See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 147, 166 & n.94 (2000) (collecting cases). But see State v. Norman, 808 N.W.2d 48, 
62–63 (Neb. 2012) (holding that Nebraska’s law negatively affected personal reputation 
and its requirements satisfied “plus” prerequisite).  
 176. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 99. 
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succeeded in highlighting the reality that registration laws in fact have a 
far broader sweep, including individuals convicted of “Romeo and 
Juliet” offenses,177 a recognition that has prompted some states to expand 
exit opportunities for this subpopulation.178  
Although such changes are without question salutary, they can 
nonetheless distract from the much larger public policy debate that needs 
to occur vis-à-vis registrants who have been convicted of more serious 
offenses and constitute the lion’s share of registry populations.  
While individuals convicted of more serious sex offenses of course 
warrant punishment, it remains an empirical reality that they, like the 
vast majority of other offenders, will one day leave prison and return to 
society.179 And when they do, they will face both the debilitating effect 
of having a criminal conviction180 and the very significant adverse 
consequences of registration and community notification,181 very often 
for their lifetimes. Policy makers must be convinced that enhancing 
opportunity for exit can at once provide a positive incentive for 
individuals to remain law-abiding and better ensure that registries 
contain individuals posing greatest public safety risk.182  
Such practical arguments, however, will need to overcome a 
powerful countervailing social and political zeitgeist. In the past, the very 
idea of forcing individuals to register with government authorities 
 177. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS
IN THE U.S. 5 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/09/11/no-easy-
answers. 
 178. See supra 60–62 and accompanying text. For an example of how putting a 
“human face” on the excesses of registration can foster legislative change, see Bill 
Rankin, Restricted by Registry No More, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 18, 2010, at B1 
(recounting the saga of a 31-year-old woman who was subjected to registration and 
residential limits as a result of engaging in consensual oral sex with a 15-year-old when 
she was 17 that prompted the Georgia Legislature to rescind registration for such 
offenders). 
 179. See generally JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE
AND PRISONER REENTRY, at i, 127–29 (2003); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME
BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005).  
 180. See Logan, supra note 15.  
181. As one federal judge put it: 
While it might seem that a convicted felon could have little left of his good 
name, community notification . . . inflict[s] a greater stigma than would result 
from conviction alone. Notification will clearly brand the plaintiff as a 
“criminal sex offender” . . .—a “badge of infamy” that he will have to wear 
for at least 25 years—and strongly implies that he is a likely recidivist and a 
danger to his community. 
Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
182. As Justice Potter Stewart observed in another context: “[W]hen everything 
is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by 
the cynical or the careless.” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) 
(Stewart, J., concurring).  
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engendered concern, with the Supreme Court in 1941 emphasizing that 
“champions of freedom for the individual have always vigorously 
opposed burdensome registration systems.”183 In 1947, when California 
was contemplating creating the nation’s first state sex offender registry, 
the director of the Department of Corrections, Richard McGee, wrote to 
Governor Earl Warren that while sexual offending was “revolting,” there 
was a “principle involved which should not be disregarded. It has never 
been the practice in America to require citizens to register with the 
police, except while actually serving a sentence under the Probation or 
Parole laws.”184  
Later, courts expressed similar concern over registration. In 1973, 
the California Supreme Court in In re Birch185 invalidated a guilty plea 
based on defense counsel’s failure to advise the petitioner of an attendant 
lifelong sex offender registration requirement.186 Noting the “unusual and 
onerous nature” of registration, the Court reasoned that registration 
would make the defendant “the subject of continual police 
surveillance . . . . Although the stigma of a short jail sentence should 
eventually fade, the ignominious badge carried by the convicted sex 
offender can remain for a lifetime.”187 Ten years later, the same court 
deemed registration not only punitive in nature, for its lifetime ignominy 
and “command performances” in providing and updating information, 
but also a violation of the Eighth Amendment.188 
Times have certainly changed, however. Since the 1990s, 
registration, combined with the far more personally consequential effects 
of community notification, has enjoyed broad judicial support. In 2003, 
the Supreme Court on two occasions turned back constitutional 
challenges against state registration and community notification laws,189 
with Chief Justice Rehnquist stating in oral argument in one of the cases 
that convicted sex offenders “deserve[] stigmatization.”190 
 183. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941).  
 184. LOGAN, supra note 6, at 38–39.  
185. 515 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1973).  
 186. Id. at 12–13. 
 187. Id. at 16–17.  
 188. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 218, 222 (Cal. 1983); see also, e.g., State v. 
Miller, 520 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Kan. 1974) (“It has become common knowledge today that 
a criminal record is a serious handicap which works against the rehabilitation of the 
ex-offender. The consequences of a criminal conviction include not only formal penalties 
and restrictions imposed by law but also collateral sanctions incidentally imposed by 
society. Although the criminal offender has paid his debt imposed by law, society 
stigmatizes him with the ex-convict label.”).  
 189. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 
538 U.S. 1 (2003).  
190. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) 
(statement of Rehnquist, C.J.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
2015:219 Database Infamia 243
The social and legal acceptability of singling out sex offenders is 
evident even in progressive law reform efforts dedicated to limiting 
collateral consequences. The Uniform Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction Act, recently drafted by the Uniform Law Commission, 
specifically exempts relief from registration from the kind of relief 
attainable when successfully petitioning for a “restoration of rights.”191 
The commentary states that “additional methods of relief would be 
duplicative and perhaps inconsistent with the detailed and elaborate 
provisions for individual evaluation that now exist.”192 As made clear 
earlier, however, little basis exists to conclude that enhanced bases for 
relief “would be duplicative” or “inconsistent with . . . elaborate 
provisions for individual evaluation that now exist.”193 States that have 
undertaken efforts to expand opportunities for collateral consequences 
relief more generally, such as Illinois194 and North Carolina,195 have 
codified exceptions for registration. 
Exceptionalism is also seen with other more traditional forms of 
postconviction relief. While a pardon can automatically result in relief 
from the registry,196 it is not uncommon for states to make an exception 
for sex offender registration197 or to specify that a pardon for a 
arguments/argument_transcripts/01-729.pdf; see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 98 (“[T]he 
stigma of Alaska’s Megan’s Law results not from public display for ridicule and shaming 
but from the dissemination of accurate information about a criminal record, most of 
which is already public. Our system does not treat dissemination of truthful information 
in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as punishment.”). American courts, 
unlike their British counterparts, do not embrace the possibility of “rebiograph[y],” which 
allows a criminal record to “expire[]” over time with good behavior. See SHADD
MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES 164–65 
(2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 191. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 12 (2010), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_
final_10.pdf. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-5(f) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). Vermont, 
the first state to adopt the UCCA (in 2013, effective in 2016), also carves out registration. 
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8012(a)(1) (Supp. 2014).  
 195. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-173.3(1) (2013). 
 196. Heath v. State, 983 A.2d 77, 81 (Del. 2009) (“Because an unconditional 
pardon cannot be granted unless the Board and Governor find no propensity for 
recidivism, an unconditional pardon extinguishes the underlying premise for sex 
offenders’ registration obligations.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-704(b)(2) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (a pardon suffices). 
 197. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:544(A)–(B) (2012 & Supp. 2014) (requirement 
continues in the event of a pardon; relief occurs only when the underlying conviction is 
reversed, set aside, or vacated); Edwards v. State Law Enf. Div., 720 S.E.2d 462, 466 
(S.C. 2011) (interpreting South Carolina Code § 23-3-430(F)) (“The purpose of the 
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registerable offense must be based upon factual innocence.198 
Jurisdictions also often bar expungement of sex offense convictions,199 
and, if available, an expunged conviction will not result in relief from 
registration.200 Finally, convictions that are dismissed based on 
successful completion of probation, while sufficient to relieve other 
collateral consequences, often do not result in relief from registration.201 
Going forward, the policy question needs to be whether subjecting 
individuals to life or decades-long registration and community 
notification without the possibility of relief is sensible, not simply that 
doing so is politically popular. For legislatures, there will be difficult 
questions concerning such issues as standards of proof and thresholds of 
recidivism risk.202 When crafting provisions, however, policy 
makers—true to Justice Brandeis’s experimentalist design203—can and 
should look to the experience in states such as Iowa with its broad relief 
regime. While crafting a fair and effective relief regime will not be easy, 
amendment [to registration law] evinces the legislature’s intent to except the sex offender 
registry requirements from the broad relief afforded by the pardon statute . . . .”). 
 198. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.6C (allowing relief “if the 
registrant has been granted an unconditional pardon of innocence for the offense 
requiring registration”); S.C. CODE § 23-3-430(F) (Supp. 2014) (allowing relief when 
“the pardon is based on a finding of not guilty specifically stated in the pardon”); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.002 (West 2006) (granting relief if conviction set aside on 
appeal or if registrant “receives a pardon on the basis of subsequent proof of innocence”). 
 199. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614(e)–(f) (Supp. 2013). 
 200. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.722(b)(i), 28.723(1)(b) (West 2012); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-145.4(a)(3), -145.5(a)(3) (2013). However, if a conviction is 
expunged this can be noted on the registry if the registrant formally so requests. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.728(10) (West 2012 & Supp. 2014). In Indiana, an individual 
remains on the registry, but the conviction is denominated as expunged on the registry 
website. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-6(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). Compare State v. 
Fletcher, 974 A.2d 188, 195–96 (Del. 2009) (expungement triggers registration relief 
because it makes no sense for an individual with no legal record of a registerable sex 
offense to register as a sex offender), with State v. Divine, 236 P.3d 692, 695 (Kan. 2011) 
(holding that expungement triggers registration relief because no exception contained in 
registration law).  
 201. See, e.g., Does v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 963 (6th Cir. 2007) (interpreting 
Michigan law); State v. Robinson, 142 P.3d 729, 732 (Idaho 2006) (concluding that relief 
“cannot reach back in time to remove [petitioner] from the application of the registration 
act”); cf. Montoya v. Driggers, 320 P.3d 987, 991 (N.M. 2014) (requiring continued 
registration despite the triggering conviction being vacated on double jeopardy grounds, 
stating that conviction was “vacated[] not because the conviction lacked sufficient 
evidence, but because the conviction would result in double punishment”).  
 202. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text. 
 203. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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twenty years after registration and community notification laws first 
began to sweep the nation, it is past time for the work to begin. 
CONCLUSION 
Since their enactment in the 1990s, sex offender registration and 
community notification laws have enjoyed broad public support, proved 
largely impregnable to constitutional challenge, and expanded 
considerably in their scope. This is so despite the lack of conclusive 
research supporting their expected public safety benefit and concern that 
the laws actually exacerbate recidivism risk factors by hindering 
opportunities for work and housing and fostering social ostracism.204 For 
telling evidence of their staying power one need look no further than the 
recent California tragedy involving Jaycee Dugard who for years was 
imprisoned and sexually assaulted by a registrant who was in compliance 
with state registration requirements.205 While similarly high profile 
public safety failures typically catalyze legal change in criminal justice 
policy, the obvious policy failure resulting in Ms. Dugard’s victimization 
was met with collective disinterest. 
Nor should we expect to see a critical reexamination of Megan’s 
Laws to come as a result of fiscal considerations, such as is now 
occurring with corrections policy.206 This is because, unlike the 
enormous cost of mass incarceration, registration and community 
notification promise social control on the cheap (with the added benefit 
of publicly shaming convicted sex offenders).207 
In short, registration and community notification laws are very 
likely here to stay. In the face of this reality, law reform efforts should be 
channeled toward enhancing opportunities for exit, based on 
law-abidingness, risk of sexual reoffense, and other relevant 
considerations. While to date legislative efforts have often gone in the 
other direction, imposing limits on the opportunity for exit,208 it is hoped 
 204. LOGAN, supra note 6, at 110–32. 
 205. Marisol Bello, Questions Arise on Monitoring of Sex Offenders, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 2, 2009, at 3A.  
206. The Right on Crime initiative, comprised of fiscal and political 
conservatives, has been at the forefront of this shift. See RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.
rightoncrime.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
 207. See Wayne A. Logan, Information and Social Control, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 137, 137–40 (John T. 
Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).  
 208. See, e.g., State v. Divine, 246 P.3d 692, 694 (Kan. 2011) (noting that the 
state legislature in 2001 amended its law to delete a provision allowing petitions for relief 
prior to the expiration of 10 years); State v. Knapp, 79 P.3d 740, 742 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2003) (observing that “the legislature has embraced a successively more restrictive 
approach to releasing offenders from the registration requirement”); In re Hamilton, 725 
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that this Article has provided a framework for this much-needed change 
to occur.  
S.E.2d 393, 397 & n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the legislature deleted the right 
to automatic termination, raised the registration requirement from 10 to 30 years, and 
required that eligible individuals seeking relief from the 30-year registration requirement 
file a petition at the 10-year mark). Iowa has proven a notable exception. See State v. 
Iowa Dist. Court for Story Cty., 843 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Iowa 2014) (noting that the 2009 
amendment modified law to expand opportunities for petition). 
